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Abstract. The main objective of the paper is to give initial answers to three important 
questions. Why did Leibniz visit Spinoza? Why did his preparation for this meeting 
include a modification of the ontological proof of God? What is the philosophical result 
of the meeting and what do possible worlds have to do with it? In order to provide 
answers, three closely related manuscripts by Leibniz from November 1676 have been 
compared and the slow conceptual change of his philosophical apparatus has been 
analyzed. The last of these manuscripts was presented and read in front of Spinoza. 
Around that time Leibniz abandoned the idea of plurality of worlds (cf. Tschirnhaus) 
and instead proposed the idea of possible worlds, thus introducing possibility into the 
(onto/theo)logical structure itself in order to avoid the “precipice” of Spinoza’s 
necessity. What is interesting, however, is how exactly this conceptual change occurred 
at the end of 1676 and what its philosophical and methodological implications are. 
Key words: Leibniz, Spinoza, possible worlds, plurality of worlds, ontological proof of 
God, qualities. 
1. 1676: THE MEETING 
The meeting of Gottfried Leibniz and Baruch Spinoza is a remarkable event – both 
from a conceptual-biographical point of view and from the perspective of history of 
philosophy. First of all, this is a conversation between two almost irreducible, emblematic and 
fundamental philosophical worldviews, whose (direct or delayed) influence in the 
following centuries is perceptible and structurally determining, while, on the other hand, 
it is the last important contact of Spinoza before his death three months later. Especially 
curious is also the long (and documented) philosophical preparation of Leibniz before his 
visit; furthermore, during the meeting Leibniz exposes the ontological proof of the 
existence of God. The ―silence‖ on the part of Spinoza is, of course, also important and 
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expected – we have no record of his attitude regarding this meeting, and, in this sense, the 
latter is one-sided. Moreover, the change that occurs in Leibniz precisely during this 
period and as a consequence of his visit to the Hague, is impressive. Last but not least, 
the official attempt to cover up the motives for the visit, the content of the conversations 
and the length of stay is also symptomatic. However, the most important aspect this case 
is the following: there is something theoretic-mythological in the meeting, insofar as it 
reaffirms the slow but irreversible process of unfolding of the idea of possible worlds.  
And so, from 18 to 21 November Leibniz visited Spinoza.
1
 At that time, Spinoza (44) 
is a scandalously controversial and dangerous figure, and Leibniz, though young (30), is 
already a part of the institutional status quo. As there are many details missing, the 
interpretative risk is unavoidable, but it can be at least partially mastered through letters 
and documents. Luckily, we have them both.  
1.1. Participants 
The direct participants in the meeting are only Leibniz (01. 07. 1646 – 14. 11. 1716) 
and Spinoza (24. 11. 1632 – 21. 02. 1677). However, indirectly, extramurally, but still 
essentially, Ehrenfried von Tschirnhaus – a commentator, correspondent and critic of 
Spinoza, as well as a man who is acquainted to Leibniz (from September 1675) and who 
is also his correspondent;
2
 Georg Hermann Schuller – a German physician in Amsterdam, 
one of the closest friends of Spinoza; as well as Henry Oldenburg – the secretary of the 
Royal Society participated. All of them play a different role and, more importantly, have 
a different attitude towards the philosophical systems of Leibniz and Spinoza. 
1.2. Direct Context of the Meeting 
Leibniz arrives on a yacht (his trip starts from Paris and ends in Hannover, and on the 
way he passes through London and the Hague) and carries a letter from Henry 
Oldenburg, which he unexpectedly decides not to give to Spinoza
3
. At that time, Leibniz 
has already developed his own mathematical methodology and he carries with himself a 
small wooden box – the arithmetic calculating machine (Stewart 2006, 1, 2). 
Spinoza rents his residence in the Hague, next to one of the canals (Paviljoensgracht) 
of the northern suburb. He is 44 years old and has a birthday the same month. During the 
day he grinds lenses for microscopes and telescopes, and during the night he works on his 
metaphysics (Stewart 2006, 1, 3). 
The two of them are at different stages of their development. Leibniz is actually on 
the way and travels around; he is still reasoning about his own (mathematical) discoveries 
and ―carries them‖ with himself to different fields of knowledge and of existence: real, 
phenomenal, ideal
4
 (the connection between the ―new analysis‖ and the proof he offers 
Spinoza is obvious). Spinoza, on the other hand, is rather grinding his completed 
                                                          
1 November 8-11, in old style. All dates are given in new style.  
2 Cf. „Über Spinozas Ethik― (AA VI, 3, 384), as well as the letters to Spinoza No. 59 (January 5, 1675), No. 80 
(May 2, 1676) and No. 82 (June 23, 1676), cf. Spinoza 2002. 
3 Oldenburg is amazed: ―I cannot even guess for what reason you did not deliver my letter to Spinoza [Quid 
causae sit, quod Spinosae non tradidisti literas meas, divinare equidem non possum]‖. For more details about 
this case and the fear of Leibniz, cf. Malcolm 2003. 
4 Vidinsky 2008. 
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metaphysics and for him the details would no longer change the general arrangement; he 
does not travel and the feeling of midnight silence is intrusive.  
1.3. The Leibniz’s Official Version of  
Leibniz hides both his lengthy preparation for the meeting and the specific details 
around his stay: he officially asserts he has just happened to pass by the Hague and has 
seen Spinoza for a couple of hours, sharing with him only a few anecdotes during that 
time.
5
 Presented in this way by Leibniz, the spinozism seems so unwise that it is not even 
worth fighting or talking about it; the suggestion is that nothing could be expected from 
the meeting except a short courteously-secular conversation; as it has happen. Spinoza is 
a dangerous figure – from a political, theological, theoretical and even social point of 
view, and the visits require great caution.  
1.4. Information on the Meeting from Gallois and Friedrich 
The event, the meeting and the situation turn out to be quite different. The information 
is sufficient for us to assert at least the following: Leibniz travels to the Hague purposefully 
and exactly with the intention of meeting Spinoza; his preparation lasted for at least 
several months and his interest will continue for years. The purpose, of course, is to 
discuss and analyze the deepest philosophical grounds or problems. Leibniz stays at 
Spinoza’s for at least 3 days; they talk several times, and these conversations are long.6 
The other man (except Jean Gallois), with whom Leibniz shares more freely his curiosity, 
interest and respect for Spinoza, is Johan Friedrich, with whom in May 1677 he shares 
that he will examine in detail all of Spinoza’s manuscripts, which have survived after his 
death, and he hopes to make copies of what is valuable.
7
  
1.5. The Text from the Meeting (A81) 
Among other things, we have access to a very curious document: a short metaphysical-
logical exposition, which presents proof for the existence of God (later, Leibniz will 
return to this important idea, cf. Blumenfeld 1972). At the bottom corner of the document 
it is claimed that it was written by Leibniz himself and in front of Spinoza, and after that 
it was read out loud
8
. This is the only written testimony from these three days. The 
exposition is a non-trivial modification of the classical ontological proof known to 
Leibniz from the critique of Thomas of Aquino (see Leibniz 1992, 63; April 15, 1676) 
and from Descartes’ Meditationes (quoted explicitly in the Scholium in the proof). The 
                                                          
5 Cf. the letter to Ernest von Hesse-Reinfels of August 14, 1683 in Malcolm 2003: 227, note 5; Theodicy, §376 - 
Leibniz 2007, 355. 
6 ―Spinosa est mort cet hyver. Je l’ay veu en passant par la Hollande, et je luy ay parlé plusieurs fois et fort long 
temps‖ (AA 11, 1, 568; letter to Abbe Jean Gallois of 1677). Further in the letter Leibniz describes what 
happened during the conversations.   
7 ―Werde ich alle Manuscripta Spinosae sehen, und verhoffentlich von denen so es würdig copie haben können‖ 
(Malcolm 2003, 227, fn. 5). 
8 ―I showed this argument to Mr. Spinoza when I was at the Hague, and he thought it to be sound. Since he 
contradicted it at first, I wrote it down and read this paper to him‖ – Leibniz 1992, 103 (about the Latin original, 
cf. Leibniz 1992, 102). 
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title, put forward by Leibniz himself, is: That a Most Perfect Being Exists (AAVI, 3, 578-
579; 1989, 167-168; 1992, 100-103; Stewart 2006, 1, 4). 
The manuscript is not about possible worlds, but inside it we find: 
1. Introduction of the possibility in the onto(theo)logical structure; 
2. Indirect distinction between the compossible and incompossible through the 
problem of qualities (a common problem for God, the world and the individual); 
3. Presentation (in the form of a proof) of the qualities as compatible (compossible) in 
a single subject; and this is of crucial importance for the relation between multiplicity and 
possibility. 
2. 1675-1676: BEFORE THE MEETING 
1. Why does Leibniz visit Spinoza? 2. Why does his preparation (and the visit itself) 
involve this modification of the ontological proof of God? 3. What is the philosophical 
result of the meeting and what do possible worlds have to do with it? 
In order to answer these three questions we need to go back at least a year earlier. The 
preparation is far richer than the text presented to Spinoza – in itself this is also revealing 
of what Leibniz wants to show and wants to hide from his host. We do not know, of 
course, what the conversations between the two of them exactly contained, but the 
notorious tact of Leibniz probably did not allow him to give an explicit criticism. 
2.1. De Summa Rerum: the Philosophical Notes from the Last Year 
Leibniz discovers the mathematical analysis (an extremely important turning point for 
his entire worldview) during the autumn of 1675. In direct relation to this, from 
December 1675 to April 1676, he writes many mathematical and philosophical texts and 
in them he makes careful conceptual or thematic considerations. After April, the writing 
of the notes ceases, but starts again around the meeting with Spinoza – between October 
and December 1676. These manuscripts are extremely interesting and fluid readings and 
some of them are united under the general and symptomatic title De Summa Rerum. Let 
us now turn to them. 
In December (1675) Leibniz reflects in On Mind, the Universe and God (A57; Y1)
9
 
on the essential difference between the following two procedures: the process through 
ideas and the process through definitions – ―...processum per ideas, et processum per 
definitiones...‖ (Leibniz 1992: 2). This is essentially the difference between thinking and 
speaking. Every procedure of speaking (definitions, signs) contains within itself a 
thinking procedure (ideas); unlike the process through ideas, in the process through signs 
the thought is fixed (frozen) and intuited in its entirety. The related definitions form a 
proof. The procedure through definitions relates to the procedure through ideas like the 
procedure through drawings to the procedure through pure imaginations – processum per 
simplices imaginations – which (must) from wandering become established (Leibniz 
1992, 2). Exactly the same establishment will happen during the next year in De Summa 
Rerum. The manuscript On Mind, the Universe and God is essential because it marks the 
                                                          
9 The letter and the subsequent number mark the texts from the academic edition (A) or from the Yale’s 
bilingual edition (Y). 
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boundaries of the analysis and gives a key to understanding of the meeting with Spinoza. 
Here there is, of course, also talk about what is possible and what is impossible – a 
typical topic for Leibniz, – but in this case the most interesting thing is the statement that 
we have ideas for simple things and only signs for composite ones. This means that the 
mechanistic gathering of signs does not result in a whole idea, or, in other words, we 
cannot speak about one thing’s possibility only from the fact that his characteristics10 are 
individually conceivable. Thus we also cannot judge about the impossible only through 
thinking; about it we know only that it is incompatible with the necessary. 
In February, Leibniz writes that all possibilities cannot exist simultaneously (Leibniz 
1992, 21; A60; Y3), and further in the text he says explicitly: together, all possibilities 
cannot be understood by anyone, as they suggest contradiction. This important idea about 
the incompossibility of the possibilities already has its apparent intuition and principal 
ground.
11
 However, it is good to remember that even in a letter to Magnus von 
Wedderkop (1671) Leibniz already says that God chooses between infinite possibilities 
(AA 11, 1, 186; 1989, 146; 2005, 3). 
At the same time, Leibniz reflects not only on the impossible but also on worlds 
(mundus). It is extremely curious that in the work On Simple Forms (April 1676; A75; 
Y14) he speaks about multiple worlds and not about possible worlds (cf. bellow; as well 
as in Kulstad 2002, 230-232). The difference is important – a multitude implies existence, 
presence of these worlds. During the same month (A71; Y10), he writes that there can be 
infinitely many other spaces (spatial) or words with different laws of motion (cf. the 
comment in Rescher 1996, 140). At times, Leibniz speaks explicitly about another rerum 
natura, another existing Universe, etc.
12
  
All of this clearly shows the gradual, uncertain and slow shaping of the conceptual 
apparatus of the idea of possible worlds, but as the visit to the Hague approaches, the 
process intensifies and, more importantly, moves occasionally in the opposite direction – 
to the multiplicity of existing worlds. But what is their connection to Spinoza? 
2.2. The Role of Tschirnhaus and the Multiple Worlds 
Tschirnhaus has known Spinoza since the early 1670s and is one of his closest 
friends, but also one of his critics; on the other hand, he also knows Leibniz, thanks to the 
recommendations for latter made on behalf of Henry Oldenburg from September 1675. 
Shortly thereafter, Tschirnhaus secretly introduces Leibniz into parts of Spinoza’s 
Ethics.
13
 Tschirnhaus’ role is extremely interesting;14 but here I will focus only on one 
aspect of his influence on Leibniz – the idea of the multiplicity of the worlds. 
                                                          
10 Requisita: what, if not given, cannot exist. 
11 Immediately after the meeting with Spinoza the idea of the incompossibility entertains Leibniz again; not 
everything is compossible, as this would lead to absurdities, i.e. disharmony, not logical absurdity (Leibniz 
1992, 105). 
12 Cf. the overview in Knuuttila 2013 about the strong influence of medieval authors on the unfolding of 
modalities and possible worlds. 
13 ―Mons. Tschimhaus m'a conte beaucoup de choses du livre Ms. De Spinosa‖ in ―Über Spinozas Ethik‖ – AA 
VI, 3, 384. 
14 For example, the text On the Origin of Things from Forms (Y13; Leibniz 1992, 74-83) clearly shows the 
influence of Tschirnhaus. 
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In a letter from Schuller to Spinoza (No. 63, from 25. 07. 1675), in which he forwards 
questions to Tschirnhaus, we find an unexpected interpretation of the spinozist idea about 
the infinitely many attributes. Tschirnhaus (through Schuller) assumes there are as many 
different worlds, like the attributes God has. In each one of these other worlds the 
attribute of thinking is present (it is like a universal meta-attribute), but, instead of the 
extension, characteristic for our own world, there we have a different attribute, which is 
unknowable and incomprehensible to us. All creatures in these other worlds will re-
perceive only through two attributes – the thinking plus the attribute, which is specific for 
their own world. Spinoza does not, of course, agree with such a strange interpretation, 
and he points out the ―Remark‖ to Theorem 7 (II part of Ethics; Spinoza 1981, 110-111). 
However, in this case we are interested in something else: the similarity between 
Tschirnhaus’ interpretation of Spinoza and Leibniz’s reflections from the period of his 
preparation for the meeting with Spinoza – both at the level of ideas, concepts, word order, 
and arguments (Kulstad 2002). However, this should not be surprising – Tschirnhaus and 
Leibniz discuss exactly Spinoza’s texts. 
Consequently, Leibniz will criticize the idea of multiple worlds, as well as the idea of 
the realization of all possibilities in our world. But in 1676 he seems to be at least 
inclined to reflect on the first option. But something happens before/during the meeting 
with Spinoza, and this will finally make him abandon the view about the multiplicity of 
the worlds. On December 12, 1676, shortly after his visit to Spinoza, Leibniz sums up: 
There is no need for the multitude of things to be increased by a plurality of worlds 
(Leibniz 1992, 102-103). The hesitations suddenly disappear. 
2.3. Manuscripts and Variants of the Text from the Meeting 
Almost none of the aforementioned problems, fluctuations, and excitements is explicitly 
present in the manuscript from the meeting. What Spinoza hears is just a methodological 
introduction of the possibility, which allows it to be thought through the idea of 
(in)compatibility and through the prism of the onto(theo)logic. Prior to the visit, Leibniz 
develops at least several variants of the proof, so that we have access to three different 
manuscripts, including А81: А79. Quod Ens Perfectissimum Sit Possible (AA VI:3, 572-
574; 1992: 90-95) from November 1676; A80. Ens Perfectissimum Existit (AA VI:3, 575-
577; 1992: 96-101) from November 1676; A81. Quod Ens Perfectissimum Existit (AA 
VI:3, 578-579; 1989: 167-168; 1992: 100-103) from 18-21 November 1676.  
2.4. A81: That a Most Perfect Being Exists 
As a starting point I will take the last manuscript (A81) – the text which was 
presented to Spinoza.
15
 I will not comment on the validity of the argumentation, the 
assuming of the opposite as a method or the procedure through definitions (more about 
the argumentation in Lomasky 1970; Blumenfeld 1972; Werther 1996; Nachtomy 2011, 
as well as in Blumenfeld 1995, 357-364); in this case, only the individual claims are 
important. To this end I provide a structured analysis, which follows the chronology of 
                                                          
15 On the other side of the paper there are written with the handwriting of Leibniz references to the following 
theorems from the Ethics: 2, 5, 10, 22, 23, the Scholium to 31 – all from part I; and to the Theorems 19, 22, 26, 
29, 49 from part II; cf. AA 11, 1, 427-428. 
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the exposition and distinguishes the individual steps. The steps match the paragraphs 
except for 4-5, where – as I have noted – the fourth paragraph of the manuscript covers 
steps 4 and 4a, and the fifth paragraph covers the steps from 4b to 5 inclusive.  
1. Definition: ―Perfection‖ is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute [§1]; 
2. Unfolding of the Definition: Every simple thing is unanalyzable (it is not an 
aggregate) and indefinite (cannot be understood through negation, through 
boundaries) [§2]; 
3. Theses to be Proved: All perfections are compatible with each other (in one 
subject) [§3]; 
4. Proof by Assuming the Opposite: We take the proposition ―A and B are 
incompatible‖, where A and B are perfections cf. (step 1) [§4-5]; 
a. The proposition ―A and B are incompatible‖ is unverifiable, because A and B 
are unanalyzables (steps 4, 1 and 2); 
b. The proposition ―A and B are incompatible‖ is not self-evident; 
c. All necessity true propositions are either verifiable, or self-evident; 
d. Hence, the proposition ―A and B are incompatible‖ is not a necessarily true 
proposition; 
e. Hence, A and B may be in the same subject. 
5. Consequence: All perfections (A, B, C…) are compatible [§5]; 
6. Consequence: There is a present or intelligible subject of all perfections, or a 
perfect being [§6]; 
7. Consequence: Existence is perfection and therefore a most perfect being exists 
[§7]; 
8. [Later added] Scholium: Here we have a brief reflection on Descartes, in which the 
unsubstantiated Cartesian premise (that a most perfect being is possible without any 
proof) is criticized. From the fact that it is possible, of course, directly follows the 
existence, but for Leibniz the possibility has to be proven (cf. steps 1-7). 
2.5. A79: That a Most Perfect Being is Possible 
From now on I will refer through the numbering in triangular brackets to the just 
exposed steps in A81. After the statements, which later do not appear in A81, I will 
simply put <0>. 
It is the first half of November 1676, shortly before his meeting with Spinoza. Leibniz 
begins his exposition with a sense of discovery. He suspects that he has found proof that 
a most perfect being is possible (the latter does not involve a contradiction
16
). The text is 
visibly narrative and Leibniz explains that it will be sufficient to prove that all the 
positive attributes are compatible <3>. Even in the first sentence the following concepts 
are presented as synonyms: essences, qualities, positive attributes; for short, I will refer 
to this line of synonyms as EQA <0>. Leibniz distinguishes between two kinds of 
attributes: analyzable and unanalzable <0> and from here it follows that it is sufficient to 
show the compatibility only of the basic, unanalyzable attributes, it is even sufficient only 
to point out any two unanalyzable attributes <1-2>. So there is analyzability (aggregates; 
composites) and non-analyzability (primitiveness) of EQA. The primitive EQA are 
                                                          
16 The possible is logically defined as what does not consist in itself contradiction: ―...sit possibile, seu non 
implicet contradictionem‖ (Leibniz 1992, 90). 
220 V. VIDINSKY 
perceived through themselves <0>: sive quae per se concipiuntur (Leibniz 1992, 90). 
Leibniz continues with the assumption of the opposite: ―[EQA] A and B cannot be in the 
same subject‖ <≈4> . In order to be necessarily true, it has to be either proven, or to be an 
identical proposition <≈4c>. Leibniz now considers ―Where A is, B cannot be‖ and 
claims two things about it: 
1. It is not an identical proposition, because these must be positive EQA, and in the 
case A would be a negation of B. 
2. It cannot be said, since the proof requires analysis of at least one of the two 
attributes, or of both simultaneously, and EQA are unanalyzable <4a-b>. 
Therefore, the incompatibility cannot be demonstrated or proved (Leibniz 1992, 93) – 
<4d>, i.e. all EQA are compatible <5>. There may be a creature with all simple EQA 
<≈6; 4e>. 
At least at first glance, the deviations from A81 are not that great. However, the 
manuscript continues and strengthens the differences (hereafter everything is marked 
<0>). In the following paragraph, Leibniz attempts to show that this most perfect being is 
necessary, but the argument is different from <7>: God’s existence in this case is not the 
main goal; this is evident from the title of the manuscript. According to Leibniz, the 
impossible is that which has no (external or internal) reason for its existence.
17
 A most 
perfect being does not have an external reason, therefore, it is either impossible (which 
contradicts to <6>), or has an immanent reason in itself, that is, it is necessary. This is a 
very curious argument in the style of ―Spinoza‖; however, the analogy does not stop here. 
Right after that Leibniz points out two important things – every positive attribute is 
infinite, and the negative affections (that is, the modes) result from the multiplicity of 
positives attributes. Here, the closeness to Spinoza’s structure, topics and terminology is 
intrusive; Leibniz is obviously preparing for the meeting. The next paragraph is even 
more impressive: all things differ not substantially (radically), but only modally; if we are 
leibnizians, we should have put an exclamation mark here. The radical (substantial) 
difference means that the thing is understood per se – without any other – through all its 
own characteristics (omnia requisita) and without any relation to some foreign 
characteristics (cf. Ethics, part 1, Def. 3). But, in terms of things, for Leibniz it is obvious 
that they have common reason and common characteristics, and hence – common 
essence. Therefore, things differ only modally,
18
 i.e. they do not differ from each other, 
and everything is one, as Plato had said in Parmenides (Leibniz 1992, 95). 
The manuscript also ends in an unexpected way. First, with a description of how the 
metaphysical text is to be composed – necessary are only proofs about things that 
contradict common belies, and this is in direct connection with Leibniz’s repeated 
criticism to Spinoza about the alloglossia and logomachia in his texts (Lærke 2009). 
Second, it ends with definitions of the main concepts in the exposition – attribute, 
affection, essence, – and these definitions partially imitate the concepts and the approach 
of the Ethics.  
                                                          
17 ―Ergo vel nullam habere potest existendi rationem, adeoque impossibile est‖ – AA Vl, 3, 572; 1992, 92. 
18 Leibniz gives as an example a town and the various perspectives to it – seen from above or from a plain.  
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2.6. A80: A Most Perfect Being Exists 
The chronologically next manuscript is different from a stylistic point of view – 
instead of being narrative and descriptive, the exposition is rather argumentative (with 
many additions or clarifications). It begins with the following statement: ―The perfections, 
or the simple forms, are either absolutely positive qualities, or indefinable and unanalyzable‖ 
<1-2>. Here we find again a synonymous order, similar to EQA, but the absences of the 
spinozists concepts ―attribute‖ and ―essence‖ (replaced by ―simple forms‖ and ―perfections‖) 
are intrusive. What is preserved are the qualities <1>. The interesting part is that Leibniz 
adds that indefinable and unanalyzable are also our thoughts about these qualities 
(compare with the views from autumn of 1675). 
Leibniz then explicitly states (following Plato’s Theaetetus) that a proposition with an 
unanalyzable subject cannot be proved (all general propositions are proved by analysis of 
the subject, Leibniz 1992, 97, 99); this claim cannot be found explicitly in A81, but is 
hidden in <4a>. On the other hand, the necessary and unprovable propositions are 
identical or they are variations on coincidence <0>. Any true, universal and necessary 
proposition is either unprovable (identity), or provable <≈4c>. From here on Leibniz 
proceeds to the consideration of the impossibility of the existence of A and B in the same 
subject and demonstrates that this is not identity, and it cannot be proved <4a-e>. After 
that in quick succession <5, 6, 7> follow. Leibniz adds: existence is a perfect, simple 
form, an absolutely positive quality (Leibniz 1992, 97).  
The following two paragraphs explain: first, that for the proof of the necessary 
existence it is sufficient to be shown that it is possible <≈8>; and, secondly, (in a long 
note), the relationship between analysis and proof in themselves is explained <0> – 
extremely interesting reflections, for which we do not have time and place here. However, 
the most curious thing is that the manuscript ends with an annex, which is almost 
identical to manuscript A81, written in front of Spinoza. This means that Leibniz has 
refined the argumentation even before the meeting, as the differences are almost able to 
be fully neglected. Everything needless is removed and he arrives at the Hague with his 
arithmetic machine and thoughts about the possibility.  
3. ANSWERS AND ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
The comparison of the three manuscripts reveals several important points: 
Possibility. The consistent clarification of the argumentation and, more importantly, 
the gradual disappearance of the terms and topics, introduced by Spinoza, are evident 
(half of the <0> claims). On the other hand, the comparison allows us to see that the 
argument is directed precisely against the philosophical grounds of Spinoza and this is 
done through “Spinoza” himself. 
Compossibility. Secondly, according to Leibniz the incompatibility cannot be proved 
with respect to any simple, positive qualities, i.e. they are all compossible. This has a 
direct relation to the intuition (from the autumn of 1675) that we cannot speak about the 
possibility of a thing just from the fact that its characteristics are thought separately. 
Moreover, the qualities are connected in a single subject and thus the topic about the 
multiplicity is partly overshadowed by that of compossibility. Yes, all perfect qualities 
are compatible, but this immediately opens the way also to the incompossibility of other 
qualities (or possible worlds). Let us recall that in February he claims: together, all 
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possibilities (and not only the simple qualities) cannot be understood by anyone, as they 
suggest contradiction. 
Analysis. Thirdly, Leibniz attempts to create a different method, but parallel to the 
mathematics analyticalone, the objects of which are basic, indivisible and indefinable 
qualities (this has some well-known and long-term consequences: the monads). However, 
as it is evident in A81 part from the key moments are premised: the connection between 
analysis and proof, as well as <4c>. 
Let us now go back to the main issues. The answers down below are incomplete but 
they outline some framework and in this sense they resemble an initial sketch: 
Why did Leibniz visit Spinoza? Apart from everything else, this is a desire to test 
Spinoza’s thesis (as Leibniz understands it) that everything happens by an absolutely 
necessity. The direct meeting ensures this verification. As a result Leibniz will be 
terrified that he has come so close to the ―precipice‖ of necessity (Leibniz 1989, 263-
266). So the introduction of contingency and possibility is the only way by which the 
philosophy can continue. 
Why did his preparation for the meeting (and the visit itself) include this 
modification of the ontological proof of God? Leibniz’s argumentative move is 
extremely interesting: according to him, in the case of Descartes and in that of Spinoza 
there is a serious oversight, because before the proof of the necessity of something, first 
its possibility has to be proven (why God has infinitely many attributes in Spinoza, is this 
possible, can it be proved?). The most elegant way to introduce this inclusion of the 
problem of possibility, without causing a direct conflict, is through the triviality of the 
ontological proof (something, which was accepted and exposed by both Descartes and 
Spinoza). On the other hand, this is the most fundamental introduction of possibility at 
all, and from now on it is going to be a main concept in ontology. 
What is the philosophical result of the meeting and what do possible worlds have 
to do with it? The result is that Leibniz abandons the idea about the multiple existing 
worlds – in the interpretation of Tschirnhaus this idea is associated precisely with 
Spinoza and the infinitely many existing attributes of God. Instead, Leibniz offers an 
analysis of the qualities and finally accepts the idea of possible worlds; and so the 
problem about the necessity is ―resolved‖ through free will and the principle of sufficient 
reason. From now on, Leibniz’s philosophy unfolds in a single direction/system; the 
reconceptualizations of his ideas become stable; even his objections to his 
contemporaries often repeat the objections to Spinoza. The meeting also has some 
extremely important implications in the history of philosophy: 
 in terms of rationalization of the possibility as a whole; 
 in terms of the role of the transcendental philosophy a hundred years later, 
and 
 even in terms of the reduction of the modalities in the contemporary analytic 
tradition. 
But those three are other and different stories. However, since the purpose of this 
historical review is to move gradually to the contemporary problematic, this inquiry is 
just a prelude. 
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MOGUĆI SVETOVI U BEZDANU: 
ZAŠTO JE LAJBNIC SREO SPINOZU? 
Osnovni cilj ovog rada je pružanje odgovora na tri važna pitanja. Zašto je Lajbnic posetio 
Spinozu? Zašto je njegova priprema za ovaj susret uključivala modifikaciju ontološkog dokaza o 
postojanju boga? Šta je filozofski rezultat ovog susreta i šta sa tim ima ideja mogućih svetovi? Da 
bismo dali odgovore na ova pitanja, upoređivaćemo paralelno tri Lajbicova rukopisa iz novembra 
1676.godine, međusobno vrlo povezana. Uz to, analiziraćemo tri konceptualne promene u njegovoj 
filozofskoj aparaturi. Poslednji od ova tri rukopisa, Lajbnic je predočio Spinozi. Negde u to vreme 
Lajbnic je odustao od ideje o mnoštvu svetova (vidi: Tschirnhaus), i umesto toga predložio je ideju 
mogućih svetova, uvodeći time ovu u samu (onto/teo)logičku strukturu kako bi izbegao „bezdan“ 
Spinozine nužnosti. Ono što je zanimljivo, međutim, je zapravo kako se tačno ova konceptualna 
promena desila krajem 1676. godine i šta su njene filozofske i metodološke implikacije.  
Ključne reči:  Lajbnic, Spinoza, mogući svetovi, mnoštvo svetova, ontološki dokaz za postojanje 
boga, kvaliteti. 
 
